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Abstract:
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 and the financial panic that
ensued, the Federal Reserve moved rapidly to reduce the federal funds rate to .25%. It was
quickly judged that additional measures were needed to stabilize the U.S. economy. Beginning in
December 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank initiated three rounds of unconventional monetary
policies known as Quantitative Easing.

These policies were intended to reduce long-term

interest rates when the short term federal funds rates had reached the zero lower bound and could
not become negative. It was argued that the lowering of longer-term interest rates would help the
stock market and thus the wealth of consumers.

This paper carefully investigates three

hypotheses: QE impacting long-term interest rates, QE impacting the stock market and QE
impacting unemployment using a Markov regime switching methodology. We conclude that
quantitative easing has contributed significantly to increases in the stock market but less
significantly to long-term interest rate and unemployment.
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THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE ASSET PURCHASES ON THE S&P 500 INDEX,
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES AND UNEMPLOYMENT

1. Introduction
Before the Global Financial Crisis, monetary policy in the U.S. typically consisted of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) setting a target for the federal funds rate which is the
overnight interest rate at which banks lend to one another. The target for the fed funds rate was
determined by some version of the Taylor rule that expressed the target fed funds rate as the sum
of certain terms expressing values of the long-run real interest rate, the target rate of inflation, the
deviation of actual real output from potential real output and the deviation of actual inflation
from the targeted inflation, with the last two terms receiving certain weights adding to one. The
Fed did not use the Taylor rule mechanically; it evaluated numerous economic developments that
surrounded the particular economic conditions prevailing at that time and followed a risk
management approach in selecting the targeted fed funds rate. This meant that if there were
certain risks with low probability but with potentially very high costs, such as the Y2K problem,
the FOMC was prepared to lower the fed funds relative to the Taylor rule number to counter the
risks of that period.
The Lehman bankruptcy in mid-September 2008 and the severe financial panic that was
triggered from this unexpected development induced the Fed to rapidly reduce the fed funds rate
to .25% that is essentially zero. A Taylor rule mechanical calculation during the last quarter of
2008 would have produced a negative fed funds rate but since the Fed was constrained by the
zero as its lower bound, it became quickly apparent that unconventional new tools were
necessary to help the U.S. economy stabilize. The large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) or
Quantitative Easing (QE) as they were called, was such a tool. QE consists of the Federal
Reserve purchasing U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) with
the aim of driving down longer-term interest rates, thereby stimulating economic activity.
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It is the purpose of this paper to carefully investigate the impact of quantitative easing on the
stock market, the 10-Year Treasury Note and Unemployment. We first give a brief overview of
QE, in section 2 and then in section 3 discuss selectively the literature that evaluates the
performance of QE. After this introductory analysis we formulate our hypotheses and describe
the data used in section 4. The methodology used and the results are presented and discussed in
section 5 and conclusions are summarized in section 6.

2. The Evolution of QE
The series of 3 QE between the Fall of 2008 and the termination of the third during the Fall of
2014 was, obviously, not planned in advance. Each QE had its own characteristics. The first
one signaled the Fed’s strong determination to contain the Great Recession and, it may be
argued, contributed to the termination of the recession in June 2009. The second and third QE
were initiated because of subpar recovery with persistent high unemployment and low inflation.
In all three QE strategies, the Fed reasoned that such a reduction in longer-term rates would
allow firms to save on their debt refinancing and other things being equal to achieve higher
earnings and profits thus helping their stocks and restoring the wealth of households that held
such stocks as a driver of stabilizing the real economy.
QE1 was announced by the FOMC on November 25, 2008. The plans were for the Fed
to purchase $600 billion on Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and Agency Debt. The plan was
officially implemented on December 15, 2008. It was extended on March 18, 2009 when the
FOMC announced the purchase of an additional $750 billion in MBS and $300 billion of
Treasuries. The plan was concluded by December 2009.
QE2 was announced by Chairman Bernanke in his Jackson Hole speech on August 27,
2010 and officially implemented in early November 2010. QE@ consisted of $600 billion of
Treasury Bonds purchases. On September 21, 2011, the FOMC announced plans for purchasing
$400 billion in longer-dated Treasuries by selling shorter-dated ones.

This was known as

Operations Twist. This Program was extended by an additional $267 billion on June 20, 2012.
QE3 was announced by the FOMC on September 2012. It did not specify the total
amount but indicated monthly purchases of $40 billion in MBS. This monthly amount was
increased by another $45 billion of purchases of Treasuries on December 12, 2012. This monthly
3
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amount of $85 billion of purchases of MBS and Treasuries continued for all of 2013 and was
tapered gradually over 10 months prior to its termination on October 29, 2014.
As a result of these QE strategies the balance sheet of the Fed has expanded from about 1
trillion of assets prior to the crisis to over $4 trillion during the third quarter of 2014. The critical
question is this: what have these three massive Quantitative Easings have accomplished? There
is a general and a particular response. The general response claims that when the Fed reached its
zero lower bound, it became obvious that the stabilization of the US economy required additional
monetary stimulus, because economic growth was very slow and there was no risk of inflation.
The gradual return to moderate economic growth of the US real economy since the end of the
Great Recession in June of 2009 is partial evidence of the overall effectiveness of the 3 QEs. The
particulars of these strategies address the channels of monetary transmission: if QE reduces
longer term interest rates, then consumers may pay less for their debt obligations and thus have
more money for consumption; simultaneously, longer term interests reduce the debt obligations
of corporations and private firms, thus increasing their profits and contributing to higher asset
valuations. In turn, such higher asset valuations encourage corporate business investments and
increases in employment. These ideas will guide the formulation of our hypotheses.

3. Review of the Literature
Numerous studies have investigated the impact of large scale securities purchases on interest
rates. Williams (2011, 2013) reports a summary of these findings and indicates that there is
empirical evidence that these purchases have affected the longer term interest rates; however
there is little evidence that these purchases have had specific effects on the macroeconomy
because it is very difficult statistically to test such a hypothesis. Table 1 below presents a sample
of representative studies and is reproduced from Williams (2013). There is a consensus that QEs
have reduced long-term interest rates only minimally.
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ESTIMATES OF IMPACT OF ASSET PURCHASES ON 10-YEAR TREASURY YIELD

Study

Sample

Doh (2010)
Bomfim and Meyer (2010)
Krishnamurthy-Vissing-Jorgensen (2011,
2012)

post-War U.S.
(pre-crisis)
QE1
QE1
post-War U.S.,
QE1, and QE2

Gagnon-Raskin-Remache-Sack (2011)

QE1

D’Amico and others (2011)
D’Amico-King (2013)

QE2
QE1Treasury
purchases

Hamilton-Wu (2011)

U.S., 1990 -QE2

Greenwood-Vayanos (2008)

Method

Estimated Effect
of $600B LSAP
(±2 std errors if
avail.)a

time series

14 bp (±7 bp)

event study
event study

24 bp
18 BP

time series

15 bp (±5 bp)

event study, time
series
event study
security-specific
event study
affine no-arbitrage
model

30 bp (±15 bp),
18 bp (±7 bp)
45 bp
100 bp (±80 bp)
17 bp

Swanson (2011)

QE1 MBS
purchases
Operation Twist

Joyce-Lasaosa-Stevens-Tong (2011)

U.K. LSAPs

Neely (2013)

effect of U.S.
QE1 on foreign
bond yields

event study

17 bp (±13 bp)

Christensen-Rudebusch (2012)

QE1, QE2, and
U.K. LSAPs

event study, affine
no-arbitrage
model

10 bp

D’Amico-English-Lopez-Salido-Nelson
(2012)

U.S., pre-crisis
weekly

time series

depends, roughly
45 bp

Bauer-Rudebusch (2013)

QE1, QE2

Li-Wei (2013)

U.S., pre-crisis

Hancock-Passmore(2011)

time series
event study
event study, time
series

event study, affine
no-arbitrage
model
affine no-arbitrage
model

depends, roughly
30 bp
15 bp (±10 bp)
40 bp

16 bp
26 bp

Sources: Greenwood-Vayanos (2008, Table 2), Krishnamurthy-Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, Section 4), Gagnon et al.
(2011, Tables 1-2), Chen and others (2012, Table 1), D’Amico-King (2013, Figure 5), Hamilton-Wu (2011, Figure
11), Hancock-Passmore (2011, Table 5), Swanson (2011, Table 3), Chung et al. (2012, Figure 10), Joyce et al.
(2011, Chart 9), Neely (2013, Table 2), Bauer-Rudebusch (2013, Table 6), Christensen-Rudebusch (2012, Table 8),
D’Amico et al. (2012, Conclusions), Li-Wei (2013, Tables 3, 6). a. Almost all of these estimates involve John
Williams’ calculations to renormalize the effect to a $600 billion U.S. LSAP.
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4. Data and Hypotheses
The vast majority of papers address the impact of QE on the long-term 10-Year Treasury Note.
Since QE3 has been terminated in late October 2014, there are currently no studies of its impact.
We contribute to the literature research in 3 ways. First we claim that all 3 QEs have
influenced the long-term 10 year T-Note. Then we extend the influence of the QE to its impact
on wealth as measured by the S&P 500 Index. Even casual observation suggests that QEs have
contributed substantially to increases in the total S&P 500 index. For example, the S&P 500
Index increased by 18% from the beginning of QE1 to its end; by 11% during the second wave
of QE and by 26% during the third QE. There is also evidence that the 2 QEs have reduced the
unemployment rate that stood at about 10% when the first QE was introduced and is now at the
end of the third QE at 6%. The three hypotheses to be tested can be expressed as follows:
Hypothesis #1: Did the three rounds of QE influence the 10-year Treasury Note?
Hypothesis #2: Did the three rounds of QE influence the S&P 500 Index?
Hypothesis #3: Did the three rounds of QE influence the rate of unemployment?
The data used for Quantitative easing are weekly (Wednesday) total Fed assets from
December 18, 2002 to the end of QE in October 22, 2014, appropriately matched with weekly
point data for the 10-year Treasury Note rate and the S&P 500 Index. For the third hypothesis
we use monthly unemployment rates and match these rates with the weekly amount of Fed assets
reported immediately prior to the announcement of the unemployment rate. Our monthly data
begin on Dec 25, 2002 and ends on Sept 24, 2014.
These above three hypotheses can be tested via the following regime switching
regressions, assuming there are two regimes only and the regimes switch according to a Markov
chain with time invariant transition probabilities.
Hypotheses 1: Weekly Data
  TenYrNotet   0,St  1,St   FAt 1   2,St   TenYrNotet 1   1,St , 1,St



2
N 0, 1,S



Hypothesis 2: Weekly Data
 SP500t   0,St  1,St   FAt 1   2,St  SP500t 1   2,St , 2,St



2
N 0, 2,S
t
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Hypothesis 3: Monthly Data
  UnEmploy t   0,St  1,St   FAt 1   1  UnEmploy t 1   2   UnEmploy t 2   1,St

1,St



2
N 0, 1,S



Following Hamilton (1994), the matrix of transition probabilities is defined as:

P
P   11
 P21

2
P12 
 ’ with  Psj  1 , and Psj  0 for s, j = 1, 2.
P22 
s 1

The expected duration of the high volatility regime is given by E(S=1) = 1/(1- P11) and that for
the low volatility regime is given by E(S=2) = 1/(1- P22).
It is important to point out before proceeding with the analyses of the results that all data series
are first differenced to avoid non-stationarity issues. Thus, for SP500 we use log of the changes.

Analysis of Results
Our results are presented in Tables 1, 1a, 2, 2a, 3, 3a and others that follow.
In our analysis with three different target variables i.e. Ten Year Note, the S&P 500 index
and the unemployment rate, the effect of Fed Asset changes have differing impacts in the two
different regimes.
We allow regime structures to address changes in unconditional (historical) volatility
over the sample period. An economist does not observe the regimes, but has to infer that from
the data. The estimation routine generates two interesting by-products in the form of regime
probability and the smooth probability. Kim and Nelson (1999) discuss these algorithms in great
depth in chapter 4. The regime probability at time t is the probability that a particular state is
operating at that time, conditional on all information up to (t-1). This is a key input for
forecasting purposes. The other by-product is the smooth probability, which is the probability of
a particular state in operation at t conditional on all information in the sample. In some sense, the
smooth probability allows the researcher to ‘look back’ and observe how regimes have evolved
over time. In the following paragraph we focus on this topic.
With visual inspection of the plot of the probability of staying in the low volatility
regime, it appears that, as if, there has been a change of behavior around January 2008. The
7
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sample has been classified in two different levels of volatility. The volatility measures for two
regimes are statistically significant as well as the elements of the transition probability matrix.
The probability of staying in the low volatility regime is higher and it is apparent from both the
tables.
From Table 1 it is clear that the Fed Asset changes have no impact on Ten Year Note in
either regime. From Table 1a we see that there are a low volatility regime lasting on average 88.6
weeks and a high volatility regime lasting 36.7 weeks. In general the volatility of the 10-Year
Note was not turbulent during the pre-crisis or the post crisis period and our methodology does
not confirm a significant impact of QE on the Ten Tear Note. This is consistent with most other
studies.
Table 2 shows that the low and high volatility regimes are shorter than the ones of the
Ten Year Note. From Table 2a we see that the low volatility regime lasts 14.1 weeks and the
high volatility only 7.6. Table 1 indicates that Fed Asset changes influence negatively the S&P
500 in the high volatility level. This makes sense because equity markets appeared to correct
whenever there were expectations of discontinuing QE.
Finally, Table 3 indicates that unemployment was influenced by QE only in the low
volatility regime. Table 3a illustrates that the unemployment was very turbulent during the
crisis.
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Table 1
Dynamic of Ten Year Note: Two State Markov Switching Paradigm
St  1
St  2
Intercept
FA(t-1)*0.0001
TenYrNote(t-1)
Log(Volatility)

-0.002123

-0.004641

(-0.34)
0.000169
(0.06)
-0.012970
(-0.19)
-2.32*
(-40.57)

(-0.35)
-0.000751
(-0.20)
-0.087577
(-1.15)
-1.72*
(-18.52)

Transition probability matrix pi, j : j  i
i 1
i2

j 1

j2

0.988716*
(6.37)
0.027233

0.011284
0.972767*
(4.39)

Average duration in a particular state (Weeks)
88.61

36.72

The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics computed from the information matrix. Single * indicates
significance at 1% level and double * indicates significance at 5% level and triple * indicates significance at
10% level.
Model Diagnostics: Durbin-Watson Stat: 1.98, Hannan-Quinn criterion: -1.29

Table 1a
Smooth Probability St = 1
Prob St = 1 (Lower Volatility)
1.000
0.900

0.800
0.700
0.600
0.500
0.400
0.300

0.200

8-Jul-13

24-Feb-12

12-Oct-10

30-May-09

16-Jan-08

3-Sep-06

21-Apr-05

8-Dec-03

0.000

26-Jul-02

0.100

Regime Classification Measure: 25.2
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Table 2
Dynamic of S&P 500: Two State Markov Switching Paradigm
St  1
St  2
Intercept
FA(t-1)
SP500(t-1)
Log(Variance)

5.391381*

-3.838662

(5.67)
0.002627
(0.65)
-0.085295
(-1.45)
2.76*
(37.42)

(-1.36)
-0.020479*
(-3.22)
-0.193744*
(-2.33)
3.63*
(55.90)

Transition probability matrix pi, j : j  i
i 1
i2

j 1

j2

0.929129*
(4.36)
0.128936

0.070871
0.871064*
(6.83)

Average duration in a particular state (Weeks)
14.11

7.56

The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics computed from the information matrix. Single * indicates
significance at 1% level and double * indicates significance at 5% level and triple * indicates significance at
10% level.
Model Diagnostics: Durbin-Watson Stat: 1.95, Hannan-Quinn criterion: 9.24

Table 2a
Smooth Probability St = 1
Prob St = 1 (Lower Volatility)
1.000
0.900

0.800
0.700
0.600
0.500
0.400
0.300

0.200

8-Jul-13

24-Feb-12

12-Oct-10

30-May-09

16-Jan-08

3-Sep-06

21-Apr-05

8-Dec-03

0.000

26-Jul-02

0.100

Regime Classification Measure: 38.2
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Table 3
Dynamic of Unemployment Rate: Two State Markov Switching Paradigm
St  1
St  2
-0.156555*
-6.51
0.005619**
1.99
-1.748811*
-19.19

Intercept
FA(t-1)*0.0001
Log(Volatility)
UnEmploy(t-1)

0.351140*
6.83
0.006551
1.06
-1.218113*
-5.77
0.625897*
8.55
-0.667069*
-8.60

UnEmploy(t-2)
Transition probability matrix pi, j : j  i
i 1
i2

j 1

j2

0.642301*
2.38
0.866399

0.357699

Average duration in a particular state (Months)
2.79

0.133601**
1.93
1.15

The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics computed from the information matrix. Single * indicates
significance at 1% level and double * indicates significance at 5% level and triple * indicates significance at
10% level.
Model Diagnostics: Durbin-Watson Stat: 2.10, Hannan-Quinn criterion: 0.7

Table 3a
Smooth Probability St = 1

Regime classification measure: 19.7
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Model Diagnostics
After estimating and discussing the results of the Markov-switching models above, it is
important to check for model adequacy. In this framework, it is a common practice to assess the
adequacy of these fitted models in at least the following two dimensions. The first is the BDS
(explained below) test which checks for the independence of the residuals, and the second is the
RCM (Regime Classification Measure) test which analyzes the generated regime probability
series in order to infer on the fitted models’ ability to recognize regimes from the behavior of the
data at any point of time. These tests are explained below.

Residual Diagnostics:
It is a common practice for assessing adequacy of Markov switching models to apply the test of
independence to the residual series (see Pagan and Hall, 1983). A powerful test used for
independence and, under certain circumstances, for nonlinear dependencies, was developed by
Brock et al. (1996) and is based on the correlation integral. The BDS statistic tests the null
hypothesis that the elements of a time series are independently and identically distributed (IID).
For a time series which is IID, the distribution of the statistic is asymptotically standard normal
under the null of white noise. The null is rejected if the test statistic is absolutely large, (say
greater than 1.96). If the null hypothesis of IID is rejected, this implies that the residuals contain
some kind of dependence i.e. linear or non-linear. We have carried out the BDS test for the
model residuals in E-views and the results are tabulated in Table 4. The test requires choice of
two parameters, commonly referred to as the dimension and epsilon, the distance for testing
proximity of the data points. In all our tests we used epsilon as a fraction of the range of the
residual data series. In the BDS test, under the assumption of IID, the probability of the distance
between any pair of points is less than or equal to the epsilon will be constant. Thus using
epsilon as a fraction of the range is meaningful for a residual series (Brook et al. (1996)).
The BDS test statistics in Table 4 show that the hypothesis of IID nature of the residual
series is well supported except for all the dimensions used in the study. We, thus, find statistical
support for the Markov-switching models in this regard. This adds to the incapability of any
linear model to address either the parameter instability and/or variance instability over the
sample period. Table 4 thus supports that all the three models (Ten Year Note and S&P 500 as
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targets) as well as the unemployment rate in the regime switching framework. The residuals are
being accepted as IID.

Table 4
Residual Diagnostics of the Markov Switching Model
Dimension

Ten Year Note (Model)
S&P 500 (Model)
Unemployment (Model)
2
-0.002063
0.001223
-0.001289
3
-0.005506
0.002105
0.002376
4
-0.004043
0.007853
0.003701
5
-0.002422
0.008742
-0.002654
6
-0.000600
0.009871
-0.007871
Notes: BDS test refers to the test developed by Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman and Labaron (1996) to assess adequacy
of Markov switching models.

Residual Heteroscedasticity:
Another dimension of model appropriateness is obtained from examining the heteroscedasticity
in the model residuals. In Table 5 we provide the results for any remaining ARCH effects in the
residuals series. It clearly demonstrates that our model with regime-dependent unconditional
variances adequately addresses this issue. The empirical researchers usually address residual
heteroscedasticity using GARCH type specification. In this model, we address the
heteroscedasticity in the data in the same way as in Fong and See (2002) by allowing the residual
variance to be state dependent. In this Markov-switching model, the unconditional variance is
allowed to switch, whereas in the GARCH model the conditional variance changes but the
unconditional variance however remains fixed. In such regime-based models, it is customary to
let residual variances define the regimes – low and high variance regimes.

Table 5
Residual Heteroscedasticity Test
Ten Year Note (Model)
0.036
S&P 500 (Model)
0.013
Unemployment (Model)
0.969
The entries are p-values for Ljuang-Box tests of order 24 using
squared residuals. The hypothesis of remaining ARCH effect may be
rejected for p-value greater than 0.05 (0.01) at the 5% (1%) level of
significance.
For unemployment monthly data this statistic is computed at lag 12.
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Regime Classification Measure
A source of uncertainty idiosyncratic to regime switching models is the ex-post determination of
regimes. In switching models, it is assumed that the occurrence of a regime is observed by the
market but not by the econometrician who must infer it from the model. Until recently, the
quality of regime classification was determined by focusing on the smoothed ex-post regime
transition probabilities. An innovation in this area is the Regime Classification Measure (RCM)
proposed by Ang and Bekaert (2002). This is essentially a sample estimate of the variance of the
probability series. It is based on the idea that perfect classification of regime would infer a value
of 0 or 1 for the probability series and would be a Bernoulli random variable. The Regime
Classification Measure (RCM) is defined as:

400 

1
  pt  (1  pt )
T

where pt is the probability of being in a certain regime at time t. Good regime classification is
associated with low RCM statistic values. A value of 0 means perfect regime classification and a
value of 100 implies that no information about the regimes is revealed. Weak regime inference
implies that the model cannot successfully distinguish between regimes from the behavior of the
data and may indicate misspecification.
With the data for the probability series for the three models in our study, the RCM
measures are tabulated in Tables 1a, 2a and 3a. We can see that the RCM values for all the series
are reasonably low, especially when compared to those reported in Ang and Bekaert (2002). This
shows that the model with two regimes is able to confidently distinguish which regimes are
occurring at each point in time. The lowest value for RCM is for the model with unemployment
rate as the target variable indicating erratic behavior of this data in relation to the asset purchase
program. The other two values are close enough to be conveying any other significant
information.
The low RCM measures for the data sets indicate reasonable performance of the
switching regime model with respect to the quantitative easing episodes.

14
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Conclusions
This paper reviews the large purchases of bonds and mortgage backed securities by the Federal
Reserve Bank during the past 5 years. During these three programs known as Quantitative
Easing, the Fed attempted to reduce long-term interest rates and encourage investment spending.
Numerous studies reported in this paper and elsewhere document that these three rounds of QE
had a minimal impact on long-term interest rates for an average of about 20-30 basis points.
In this paper we revisit the investigation of the impact of QE on long-term interest rates
and confirm the earlier results; we show that QE did not impact the Ten Year Note rate. We also
go beyond earlier studies and investigate the impact of QE on equities as measured by the S&P
500 Index and also on unemployment. Our results confirm that the impact of QE on equities has
been significant only in the high volatility regime. We conclude that the Fed’s channel of
quantitative easing that originally targeted the lowering of long-term interest rates was less
successful than the targeting of equities that turned out to be more successful. Thus QE
succeeded more in increasing wealth and thus consumption rather than lowering interest rates
and increasing investments. Finally, we also confirm that QE impacted unemployment only in
the low volatility regime.
The overall conclusion of this study is that much more work is needed to fully understand
how QE has impacted the US economy and to confirm the econometric evidence.
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